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model with bounded rationality via two straightforward channels. The result is a macroeconomic
model that allows for the endogenous development of business cycles and stock price bubbles. We
show that market sentiments exert important inﬂuence on the macroeconomy. They introduce high
volatility into impulse-response functions of macroeconomic variables and thus make the eﬀect of
a given shock hard to predict. We also analyze the impact of diﬀerent ﬁnancial transaction taxes
(FTT, FAT, progressive FAT) and ﬁnd that such taxes can be used to stabilize the economy and
raise funds from the ﬁnancial sector as a contribution to the costs produced by the recent crisis. Our
results suggest that the FTT leads to higher tax revenues and better stabilization results then the
FAT. However, the FTT might also create huge distortion if set too high, a threat which the FAT
does not imply.
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1 Introduction
The economies of almost every country have recently been hit by a turmoil in the ﬁnancial markets.
This so-called ﬁnancial crisis has vividly demonstrated that developments in the ﬁnancial markets
can have major impacts on the real economy. Interdependencies between real and ﬁnancial markets
should therefore obviously be taken into account when doing macroeconomics. Natural questions
to ask after the recent crisis are: To which extent does the formation and bursting of bubbles spill
over into real markets? Can ﬁnancial market regulation be used to reduce disturbances of the real
economy? How can the ﬁnancial sector be hold to account for the enormous costs created by the
recent crisis?
For about two decades now, a relatively new modeling approach has been applied to the analy-
sis of ﬁnancial and foreign exchange markets. This approach builds on the method of agent-based
computational (ABC) simulation, it drops the assumptions of rational expectations, homogeneous
individuals, perfect ex ante coordination and often also market equilibria, in favor of adaptive learn-
ing, simple interactions of heterogeneous agents, and emerging complex macroscopic phenomena.1
The approach seems very promising thus far since, on the one hand, it is grounded in the results of
survey studies2 and laboratory experiments3, and on the other hand, the emerging macro-dynamics
mimic the properties of real world data (such as martingale property of stock prices, fat tails of
return distribution, volatility clustering and dependency in higher moments)4 quite well, a success
that traditional ﬁnancial market models, building on equilibrium and rationality, do not provide.5
A huge literature has already developed on this topic that – despite its success – is largely ignored
by macroeconomists.
1 For an introduction into ABC ﬁnancial market modeling see, e.g., Samanidou et al. (2006), Hommes (2006) or LeBaron
(2006). Outstanding examples of such models are Kirman (1993), Brock and Hommes (1998), and Lux and Marchesi
(2000).
2 Consult Frankel and Froot (1987), Ito (1990), Taylor and Allen (1992) and Lui and Mole (1998).
3 Consult Caginalp et al. (2001), Sonnemans et al. (2004) and Hommes et al. (2005).
4 A detailed description of these stylized facts can be found in Lux (2009).
5 De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006), for example, compare the performance of an agent-based model with popular models
like that of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ in explaining the stylized facts of foreign exchange rates. They ﬁnd that the former
performs much better.
1One strength of the ABC method is that it naturally allows for the endogenous emergence of
bubbles. In such models, investors can typically choose from a set of diﬀerent non-rational trading
strategies. The decision which strategy to employ is reached by using an evolutionary approach: A
continuous evaluation of those strategies according to past performance leads to changes in the size
of the diﬀerent investor groups. In phases that are dominated by technically operating investors,
stock prices can deviate sharply from their underlying fundamental value. If market sentiments
change and fundamentalists dominate, convergence towards the fundamental value sets in. Inspired
by the spectacular failure of mainstream macroeconomics to provide an explanation of the current
crisis and an agenda of how to deal with it, a number of authors are calling for the use of ABC
models in macroeconomics.6 According to them, the assumptions of equilibrium, perfect ex ante
coordination, rational expectations and representative agents are very unrealistic and the reason
that macroeconomists have become blind to crisis.
The emergence of asset price misalignments (i.e. bubbles) on the ﬁnancial markets is often seen as
having the most devastating impact on the real economy. Some macroeconomic models already allow
for such misalignments. Bernanke and Gertler (1999), for example, augment the model of Bernanke
et al. (1999) by imposing an exogenously given path for asset price misalignment. In their model,
each bubble has a constant exogenous probability to burst, where ”burst” simply means that asset
prices immediately return to their fundamental value. More recently Milani (2008) and Castelnuovo
and Nistico (2010) have integrated stock price misalignment into a New Keynesian DSGE model.
Their aim is to provide insights into the dynamics of the stock price component that is driven by
utility-optimizing, rational-expecting agents. Stock price dynamics in such models are a rational
response of an ex ante perfectly coordinated economy in equilibrium. With the mentioned criticism
in mind, it is hard to imagine stock price bubbles or ﬁnancial crisis in such frameworks.
Kontonikas & Ioannidis [KI] (2005) and Kontonikas & Montagnoli [KM] (2006) use forward- and
backward-looking New Keynesian macroeconomic (NKM) models with lagged stock wealth eﬀects.
Stock price dynamics in these models are not exogenously imposed and the crash of a bubble does not
simply occur with a ﬁxed probability. Instead they make use of an endogenous dynamic process that
binds stock prices to two diﬀerent forces: One of which leads to a return towards the fundamental
6 See, e.g., Colander et al. (2008), Colander et al. (2009), Lux and Westerhoﬀ (2009), Krugman (2009), Kirman (2010),
Delli Gatti et al. (2010), and Dawid and Neugart (forthcoming). Examples of purely agent-based macro models (with
no connection to NKM) are Gaﬀeo et al. (2008) or Deissenberg et al. (2008).
2value, and the other – so-called momentum eﬀect – relates stock prices to their own past development.
While KI (2005) and KM (2006) are clearly inspired by the agent-based ﬁnancial markets literature
with its fundamentalist and chartist trading rules, none of the above models explicitly motivates the
dynamics of stock price misalignment by boundedly rational investor behavior and none makes use
of an evolutionary selection mechanism of trading strategies that is used in ABC type models.
In a recent paper Bask (2009) uses a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) framework with stock prices that are determined by the demand of two diﬀerent types of
investors: chartists and fundamentalists. While the model provides the major advantage that it
justiﬁes stock price movements by the behavior of these two types of investors, it does not allow for
an endogenous evaluation of the diﬀerent investment strategies. As in KI (2005) and KM (2006) the
aspect of evolutionary learning, that is so important for ABC ﬁnancial markets, is missing. Investors
therefore keep employing the same investment rule and do not try to learn from past observations.
In this paper, we merge a simple ABC model of ﬁnancial markets with the New Keynesian DSGE
model. Such a comprehensive model allows for the simultaneous development of endogenous business
cycles and stock price bubbles. Expectations in both submodels are formed by an evolutionary
selection process. To the best of our knowledge, no such attempt has been made so far. Since we
combine two separate subdisciplines of economics, and do not want to exclude readers who are not
familiar with both of these areas, our approach focuses on simplicity. Nonetheless, our model leads
to a number of interesting insights. We ﬁnd that the transmission of shocks is dependent on the
state of market sentiments7 at the time of its occurrence. We also ﬁnd that the negative impact that
speculative behavior of ﬁnancial market participants exerts on the macroeconomy, can be reduced
by introducing a tax on ﬁnancial transactions. We use our model to answer two questions that
are currently on the international policy agenda: (1) Is a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) or a
Financial Activities Tax (FAT) better suited for regulating ﬁnancial markets and generating tax
income for the state? (2) Should the rate of a FAT be ﬂat or progressive?
The model is developed in section 2. We demonstrate the working of our model by means
of numerical simulation and impulse response analysis in section 3. In section 4 we analyze the
7 By market sentiments we mean the state of agents opinions about economic variables that are the result of an evolu-
tionary process and not of rational forecasting. The expression is taken from De Grauwe (2010a) where it is used as a
synonym to animal spirits.
3introduction of diﬀerent kinds of taxes levied on ﬁnancial transactions. Our results are checked for
robustnes in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Our model consists of two parts, one describing the ﬁnancial sector, and one the real sector of the
economy. We use the ABC chartist-fundamentalist model proposed by Westerhoﬀ (2008) to model
the ﬁnancial market. The real sector is described by the NKM framework augmented by a cost eﬀect
of stock prices. Since we allow for an endogenous development of business cycles and stock price
bubbles, our model is an augmentation of NKM models that already include stock price bubbles,
but impose their dynamics exogenously (section 1). It is also an augmentation of those models that
integrate a stock market with diﬀerent types of investors into macroeconomics, but do not employ
endogenous learning (section 1).
An approach which is related to ours can be found in Proa˜ no (2011). The author makes use of an
ACE foreign exchange market in the context of an open economy macro model. While the general
idea is similar to ours, our way of integrating the ﬁnancial market and the real economy is very
diﬀerent. Our ﬁnancial market, in contrast to Proa˜ no (2011), ﬁrst, contains noise and is therefore
not completely deterministic. Second, it operates on a smaller time interval than the real economy.
The paper at hand can thus be seen as a complementary approach to a similar research target.
The ﬁrst problem one has to deal with is that the rules determining the dynamics of ﬁnancial
markets are likely to be very diﬀerent from those of the real markets. Economic transactions in the
former seem to take place much more frequently than in the latter.8 For example, a large fraction of
ﬁnancial transactions (10%-60% according to market)9 are accounted by algorithmic trading which
is typically of an extremely short-term intra-daily nature. This implies that both can not be modeled
on the same time scale.10
The two modeling methodologies employed throughout this paper are building on very diﬀerent
assumptions. In order to prohibit contradictions stemming from these diﬀerent assumptions of
8 Although this argument seems to be straightforward it is also backed empirically by Aoki and Yoshikawa (2007), who
ﬁnd that time series of real economic data do not share the power law distribution of ﬁnancial markets which implies
that the latter are characterized by higher economic activity.
9 Consult Matheson (2011), p. 19.
10On the explicit modeling of high frequency New Keynesian models see Franke and Sacht (2010).
4ABC and DSGE modeling, we do not simply integrate one into the other, but take the diﬀerences
seriously. As a result, we must assume that real and ﬁnancial markets are populated by diﬀerent
kinds of agents. We interpret those of the ﬁnancial market to be institutional investors, who have
the resources to participate in high frequency trading. Conversely, real market agents have neither
detailed knowledge about ﬁnancial markets, nor the possibility to participate in high frequency
trading. Subsection 2.1 deﬁnes the ﬁnancial sector of our economy, while 2.2 deﬁnes the real one.
Subsection 2.3 brings the two sectors together.
2.1 Financial Market
We use the model proposed by Westerhoﬀ (2008) to deﬁne the ﬁnancial sector of our economy for
two reasons: First, because of its straightforward assumptions and easy implementation, and second,
because it has already been used for policy analysis (especially transaction taxes) so that its behavior
in this respect is well known.11 In this model, stock price adjustment is given by a price impact
function:










DC and DF stand for the orders generated by chartists and fundamentalists, respectively.12 WC
and WF denote the fractions of agents using these strategies, and a is a positive reaction parameter.
Eq. (1) can be interpreted as a market maker scenario, where prices are adjusted according to
observed excess demand.13 Since fundamentalist and chartist investment strategies do not account
for all possible strategies that exist in real markets, a noise term ǫs is added that is i.i.d. normally
distributed with standard deviation σs. It can be interpreted as the inﬂuence of those other strategies.
t denotes the time index which is interpreted as days. For the sake of simplicity, we make use of the
standard assumption that the true (log) fundamental value of the stock price ¯ sf equals zero. Thus,
the stock price st also equals the stock price misalignment.
11The approach is, for example, also used in Westerhoﬀ and Dieci (2006) who model two ﬁnancial markets and their
interaction when introducing transaction taxes. Demary (2010) also analyzes the eﬀects of introducing such taxes in
a basic Westerhoﬀ-model augmented by diﬀerent time horizons of investors.
12Negative orders denote a supply of stock.
13There are also agent-based ﬁnancial models that make use of Walrasian market clearing. See for example Brock and
Hommes (1998).
5Chartists expect that the direction of the recently observed price trend is going to continue:
˜ E
C
t [st+1 − st] = kC [st − st−1] (2)
kC is a positive parameter that denotes the strength of trend extrapolation. The tilde on the
expectations operator indicates that the expectation is not formed rationally. Fundamentalists, on













t is the perceived fundamental value that does not necessarily equal its true counterpart ¯ sf. The
diﬀerence between s
f
t and ¯ sf is explained in detail in subsection 2.3. Assuming that the demand
generated by each type of investors depends positively on the expected price development leads to:
Di
t = ℓ Ei
t [st+1 − st] + ǫi
t i = {C,F} (4)
ℓ is a positive reaction parameter. Since (2) and (3) do not reﬂect the great amount of chartist
and fundamentalist trading strategies that exist in real world markets, the noise term ǫi
t is added.
It is normally distributed with standard deviation σi and can be interpreted as the inﬂuence of
all other forecasting strategies diﬀerent from (2) and (3). The demand generated by chartist and
fundamentalist trading rules is therefore given by:14
DC
t = b(st − st−1) + ǫC









t c = ℓ · kF (6)
The fractions of agents using the two diﬀerent investment strategies are not ﬁxed over time.
Instead, agents continuously evaluate the strategies they use according to past performance. The
better a strategy performs relative to the other, the more likely it is that agents will employ it. It
14Westerhoﬀ (2008) directly assumes eq. (5) and (6) and does not explicitly state the diﬀerent types of expectation
formations.
6is assumed that the attractiveness of a particular strategy depends on its most recent performance
(exp{st} − exp{st−1})Di
t−2 as well as its past attractiveness Ai
t−1:15
Ai
t = (exp{st} − exp{st−1})Di
t−2 + dAi
t−1 i = {C, F} (7)
The memory parameter 0 ≤ d ≤ 1 deﬁnes the strength with which agents discount past proﬁts.
The extreme cases d = 0 and d = 1 relate to scenarios where agents have zero and inﬁnite memory.
Note the timing of the model: Orders submitted in t − 2 are executed in t − 1. Their proﬁtability
ultimately depends on the price realization in t. Agents may also withdraw from trading (strategy
“0”). The attractiveness of this strategy A0





. The fraction of agents






t } + exp{eAF
t } + exp{eA0
t}
i = {C, F, 0} (8)
The more attractive a strategy, the higher the fraction of agents using it. Note that the probability
of choosing one of the three strategies is bounded between zero and one. The positive parameter e
measures the intensity of choice. The higher (lower) e, the greater (lesser) the fraction of agents that
will employ the strategy with the highest attractiveness. This parameter is often called the rationality
parameter in ABC ﬁnancial market models.17 The described mechanism can be interpreted as an
evolutionary survival of the most proﬁtable forecasting strategy.
The only diﬀerence between our ﬁnancial market submodel and that of Westerhoﬀ (2008) is that
we distinguish between the true fundamental value ¯ sf and the trader’s perception of it, s
f
t . Both
models are equivalent if s
f
t = ¯ sf.
15Recall that st is the logarithm of the stock price. In order to calculate nominal proﬁts, st has to be delogarithmized.
16See, e.g., Manski and McFadden (1981) for a detailed explanation of discrete choice models.
17Consult Westerhoﬀ and Dieci (2006), Hommes (2006) and Westerhoﬀ (2008).
72.2 Real Markets
The partial model describing the real sector is given by a hybrid NKM model. New Keynesian
models are widely used in macroeconomics because they typically allow for a good ﬁt of real world
data, and they are derived from individual optimization.
iq = δπ˜ Eq [πq+1] + δx˜ Eq [xq+1] + ǫi
q (9)










ψ˜ Eq [πq+1] + (1 − ψ)πq−1
 
+ γxq − κsq + ǫπ
q (11)
The notation of the variables is as follows: i is the deviation of the nominal interest rate from
its target, π the deviation of the inﬂation rate from its target, x the (log) output gap (i.e. its
deviation from steady state), and s the deviation of the (log) nominal stock price from its true
fundamental value ¯ sf. The subscript q = 1,...,Q denotes the time index. We keep the common
interpretation of the time index in New Keynesian models and assume that it denotes quarters.
˜ Eq [·] is the expectations operator conditional on knowledge available in q, where the tilde indicates
that they are formed non-rationally. The dynamic path of the stock price s is determined by the
model developed in the previous subsection. The variables ǫi
q, ǫx
q, ǫπ
q are stochastic elements with
zero mean.
Equation (9) is a standard monetary policy interest rule. The central bank reacts to expected
deviations of inﬂation and output from its target. For now, we use equal expectations formation
for the central bank and the market. In section 5.2 we will generalize the model by assuming that
the central bank’s expectations are diﬀerent from those of the market. Equation (10) is referred to
as the dynamic IS-curve that describes the demand side of the economy. It results from the Euler
equation (which is the result of intertemporal utility maximization) and market clearing in the goods
market. Equation (11) is a New Keynesian Phillips curve that represents the supply side. It can be
derived under the assumptions of nominal price rigidity and monopolistic competition. Asset prices
inﬂuence the economy through a balance sheet channel that works as follows: The willingness of
banks to grant credits typically depends on the borrowers’ ﬁnancial position. For example, agents
could use assets they hold as collateral when borrowing money. The more collateral a debtor has
to oﬀer, the more advantageous his credit contract will be. In this context, “advantageous” may
8mean that either credits of larger size are oﬀered or that credits of the same size could be obtained
cheaper (lower interest payments). The ﬁrst argument can be used to relate asset prices positively to
aggregate demand, as for example done in Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Kontonikas and Ioannidis
(2005), Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2006), or Bask (2009). We stress the second argument in this
paper. Higher prices of assets owned by ﬁrms increase their creditworthiness, and allow them access
to cheaper credits. Since most ﬁrms’ production is largely ﬁnanced through credits, asset prices are
inversely related to ﬁrms marginal (real) costs of production. This argument allows the addition of
the term −κsq to equation (11).18 This verbal kind of micro foundation is suﬃcient for our purposes.
The reader is referred to Bernanke and Gertler (1999) who discuss a balance sheet channel (and its
microfoundation) in more detail.
Note that we deﬁned sq as the nominal stock price gap. The so-called cost channel of monetary
transmission is commonly introduced into New Keynesian models by adding the nominal interest
rate into the Phillips-curve (see for example Ravenna and Walsh (2006) or Lam (2010)). Analogously
to this channel, we also decided to insert the nominal (and not the real) stock price gap into (11).
Note also that our deﬁnition of the stock price gap is very diﬀerent from that of Milani (2008) or
Castelnuovo and Nistico (2010), who deﬁne it as the diﬀerence between the stock price under fully
ﬂexible and somewhat rigid market conditions. Both, of course, are the result of utility optimal paths
under rational expectations. ABC ﬁnancial market models could also be employed for the analysis of
foreign exchange rates. Since a rise (fall) of foreign exchange rates would also raise (lower) production
costs – via more expensive (cheaper) intermediate inputs – they would be included with the opposite
sign (i.e. +κsq). To avoid confusion, we want to point out again that we are modeling stock prices
with the ABC submodel and not foreign exchange rates.
To derive eq. (10), it is commonly assumed that the household’s only possibility of transferring
wealth into future periods is by demanding bonds. Households therefore do not hold or trade stock.
We keep this assumption in order to allow for analysis of the isolated impact of the speculation of
ﬁnancial market participants on stock prices. We further assume that ﬁrms hold an initial amount of
stock but do not participate in stock trading. Consequently, they are only aﬀected by the ﬁnancial
sector via the balance sheet channel, and not via speculative gains. The ﬁnancial sector can not
generate proﬁts on the aggregate level by selling and reselling stock. If one agent wins from a
18Formally, the cost channel is typically introduced by adding interest costs (+α · iq) into the Pillips-Curve. If interest
costs are negatively depending on solvency and thus stock prices, the term −κ · sq has to be added instead.
9beneﬁcial transaction, others must lose. The only possibility for the aggregate stock market to
earn proﬁts is by dividend payments from the real sector. Because their relative size is small when
calculated for a daily basis, and because the Westerhoﬀ-model does not explicitly take ﬁnancial
wealth into account, we do not model the stream of dividend payments from ﬁrms to ﬁnancial
investors. As a result of the above arguments and assumptions, ﬁnancial streams between the real
and ﬁnancial sector do not exist.
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The dynamics of the forward-looking variables i, x and π depend on the future expectations ˜ Eq [xq+1],





































































Of course the parameters must be selected in a way that the system is stable. We take a closer
look on the stability conditions of the system in the next subsection after the model has been stated
completely.
Expectations in the real sector are also formed in a non-rational way. Following De Grauwe
(2010a) and De Grauwe (2010b) we assume that a certain fraction ω
opt
q of agents is optimistic about
10the future development of output while another ω
pes
q is pessimistic. Both groups form expectations
according to:
Optimists expectation: ˜ E
opt
q [xq+1] = gt (14)
Pessimists expectation: ˜ E
pes







The spread between the two expectations (2gt) is assumed to vary over time according to:
2gt =   + ν · Std[xt] (16)
The parameters satisfy  ,ν ≥ 0 and Std[xt] denotes the unconditional standard deviation of the
output gap computed over a ﬁxed window of past observations.19 The economic rationale behind this
implementation is that the agents beliefs diverge more when uncertainty surrounding the output gap
is high. In the special case of ν = 0 the divergence of beliefs is constant over time. In line with the






















The attractiveness of forecasting strategies are therefore determined by past mean squared forecast
errors (MSFEs) weighted with decaying weights. Applying discrete choice theory, the weights that























19In all numerical simulations we set µ = 0.5 and ν = 2. The mentioned time windows is set to 20 periods.
11The market’s expectation of the output gap is given by the weighted average of the two diﬀerent
forecasting strategies.
˜ Eq [xq+1] = ωopt
q ˜ E
opt




Expectations about the inﬂation rate in De Grauwe (2010a) and De Grauwe (2010b) are formed
in a similar way. One type of agents (the targeters) believes in the inﬂation target that the central
bank has announced, hence their expectations are given by:
˜ E
tar
q [πq+1] = π⋆ (22)
Another group (the extrapolators) expect that the future inﬂation rate is given by the most recently




q [πq+1] = πq−1 (23)
The markets expectation ˜ Eq [πq+1] is again determined as the weighted average of these two groups.
Where the fractions of targeters and extrapolators (ωtar and ωext) are again determined by the same
evolutionary approach used for expectations about the output gap.
Both expectations, ˜ Eq [xt+1] and ˜ Eq [πt+1], are not unrational. The diﬀerence to conventional
rational expectations (RE) is that no single agent is required to expect future dynamics rationally.
It has been pointed out by a number of authors, that forming conventional RE would indeed be
impossibly complicate.20 It would require every agent to know how everybody else would react in
every possible situation and to calculate the resulting mean time paths in advance. It is implausible
that real world human beings are capable of solving such highly complex problems. In our model,
agents choose from a set of forecasting rules that are so simple that real world human beings would
be able to employ them. Using such simple rules is not unrational, it can be understood as the
best way to deal with an overwhelmingly complex world. An evolutionary mechanism is used to
permanently evaluate these strategies and sort out the poorly performing in favor of the better ones.
20Consult Ackerman (2002), Gaﬀeo et al. (2008), Fair (2009) and Kirman (2010).
12Hence, instead of requiring rationality from the individuals (as conventional rational expectations
do), it is the result of an evolutionary dynamic market process.
2.3 Bringing the Two Sectors Together
As already mentioned, the two parts of the model run on diﬀerent time scales. The real markets
operate quarterly while the ﬁnancial market operates daily. We assume that one quarter consists of
64 trading days. Therefore, the ﬁnancial sector performs 64 increments of the time index t within
one increment of the real market’s time index q (ﬁgure 1). Quarter q is deﬁned to contain the days
64(q − 1) + 1 , ... , 64q.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
Figure 1: Time scale as indexed by days (t) and quarters (q)
We assume that the relevant value of the quarterly stock price sq that aﬀects the real sector via








Using the deﬁnitions above, we calculate the recursive dynamics of the ﬁnancial market for one
quarter q (in days: t = (q − 1) · 64 + 1 , ... ,q · 64) with the agent-based model deﬁned in section
2.1, and insert the mean of the resulting st’s into eq. (13) in order to get the impact on real sector
variables.
Now that we have set up the real and ﬁnancial markets we can deﬁne the diﬀerence between the
true fundamental stock price (¯ sf) and the fundamentalist’s perception of it (s
f
t ). The fundamental
21Eq. (24) assumes that the inﬂuence of daily stock prices on the real economy is equal for each day in the quarter. One
could instead also introduce a discounting factor into (24) to raise the relative inﬂuence of the more recent days. We








Figure 2: Channels between real and ﬁnancial markets
value of any given stock is commonly understood to be the sum of all discounted future dividend






ρk Et [dt+k] (25)
Dividends are typically closely related to real economic conditions (xq in our model). Therefore, s
f
t
would depend on the expectation of x for all future days. We decided to model the perception of the
fundamental value in a diﬀerent way for two reasons: First, it has been empirically found that stock
markets overreact to new information, i.e. stock prices show stronger reactions to new information
than they should, given that agents behave rationally.23 Second, it has been argued that in reality it
is very diﬃcult (if not impossible) to identify the true fundamental value of any stock.24 Given these
problems, it seems reasonable to assume that agents do not know the true value of ¯ sf or calculate
it in a rational way (as in eq. (25)), but instead simply take the current development of the real
economy as a proxy for it.
s
f





, h ≥ 0 (26)
The ﬂoor-function rounds a real number down to the next integer. Eq. (26) states that the funda-
mentalists’ perception s
f
t is biased in the direction of the most recent real economic activity, i.e. if
output is high (low) the fundamental stock price is perceived to lie above (below) its true counter-
part. Note that ABC models of ﬁnancial markets can typically not relate the fundamental value
to the recent economic development, since the latter is not modeled endogenously. Most models do
22Consult Campbell et al. (1997) chapter 7 for the derivation of this equation and more general versions.
23De Bondt and Thaler (1985) were among the ﬁrst to describe this phenomenon.
24For example Rudebusch (2005) or Bernanke and Gertler (1999) raise doubts of this kind.



























Figure 3: Stability Analysis26
not distinguish between s
f
t and ¯ sf, they set both equal to zero or assume them to follow a random
walk.25 Figure 2 illustrates the two channels that exist between the real and the ﬁnancial market.
Channel I (the cost channel) allows the ﬁnancial market to inﬂuence the real sector and disappears if
κ in eq. (11) is set equal to κ = 0. Channel II (the misperception of ¯ sf channel) allows for inﬂuence
in the opposite direction, and disappears if h in eq. (25) is set equal to h = 0. If both of these
cross-sectoral parameters are set equal to zero (κ = 0 & h = 0), both sectors (i.e. both submodels)
operate independently of each other.
The two cross-sectoral channels feed on each other. If stock prices are high, Channel I exerts a
positive inﬂuence on output: Solvency of ﬁrms rises which lowers their credit costs. Marginal costs
and thus inﬂation fall. As a result, output rises, which in turn exerts a positive inﬂuence on stock
prices through Channel II, and so on. To exclude explosive paths, κ has to be lower the higher h and
vice versa. Figure 3(a) shows a numerical approximation of the stability region in h-κ-space. It is
known that the policy parameters δπ and δx are crucial for the stability of the NKM model. Under
standard speciﬁcation, a suﬃcient condition for stability is δπ > 1 and δx ≥ 0. To check whether
our behavioral model possesses a similar property, we generate a numerical approximation of the
stability region in δx-δπ-space (ﬁgure 3(b)). The system is stable for δπ > 1 and δx ≥ 0 and thus
features the typical stability properties of NKM models.
25Again, Westerhoﬀ (2008) is a good example to look at since both of these approaches are discussed there.
26The parameterization used for this numerical investigation is discussed in detail below.
153 Numerical Simulations
The analysis of our model is performed by means of numerical simulation. The calibration is given in
Table 1. The parameter values for the ﬁnancial sector are exactly the same as in Westerhoﬀ (2008).
The values of σ, γ and β are so-called ”deep parameters” (or functions of such) and common in New
Keynesian models. For the policy parameters δx and δπ we use the values that have originally been
suggested by Taylor (1993). The hybridity parameters χ and ψ are set to 0.8. These parameters
have to be set larger than 0.5 in order to maintain the endogenous business cycles of the De Grauwe
(2010a) model.27 In order to set the cross-sectoral parameters, we assume that the real sector is
much less inﬂuenced by the ﬁnancial sector than the other way round.28 Therefore we set h to be
ten times larger than κ.
Table 1: Baseline Calibration of the Model
Financial sector Real sector Interaction
a = 1 σ = 1 κ = 0.1
KC = 0.04 γ = 0.17166 h = 1
KF = 0.04 β = 0.99
ℓ = 1 δx = 0.5
d = 0.975 δπ = 1.5
e = 300 ζ = 0.5
σs = 0.01 φ = 10
σC = 0.05 χ = 0.8
σF = 0.01 ψ = 0.8
σǫ = 0.15
The memory parameter for the ﬁnancial sector d = 0.975 (which is taken from Westerhoﬀ (2008))
is much higher than that for the real sector ζ = 0.5 (taken from De Grauwe (2010a)). However,
when comparing these two values, it has to be taken into account that d refers to the discounting of
information that is only one day old. Bringing it to a quarterly basis we obtain d64 = 0.2. Therefore
our calibration presumes that past information are less taken into account by ﬁnancial market agents
than by real sector agents. The intensity of choice parameters (e and φ) seam most problematic
27One can easily see that if (9) is inserted into (10), the two terms containing ˜ Eq [xq+1] cancel out if χ = 0.5. Whether
agents are optimistic or pessimistic does not play any role for the determination of xq any more. The self-fulﬁlling
character of expectations (explained in detail below) will ultimately break down.
28We have assumed that the value of x is taken as information for the development of the real sector. If stock prices
overreact to new information (De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Nam et al. (2001), Becker et al. (2007)), this implies a
strong reaction of s to x and thus a high value of h.
16since their impact on the results depends on the latent attractiveness values. We will therefore check
the robustness of our obtained result to diﬀerent parameterization of e and φ in section 5.
3.1 Dynamics of one Simulation
To demonstrate the working of our model, we perform one “representative” run. The simulated
time period consists of 100 quarters (or 6400 days). To eliminate the inﬂuence of arbitrary initial
conditions each simulation is performed with a ”burn-in” phase of 20 quarters. Figure 4 shows
the resulting dynamics for xq, πq, ωopt, ωtar, iq,
 
iq − ˜ Eq [πq+1]
 
, st, and a variable called market
sentiments. The latter represents the fraction of agents, employing the three trading strategies.
Black denotes chartist trading (WC), gray fundamentalist trading (WF), and white no trading
(W0). To generate the dynamics, a series of pseudo random numbers has to be drawn. Hence each
realization of simulated data is a unique result of the underlying random seed. The horizontal time
axes are quarterly scaled. In the diagrams containing daily data, quarters cover an interval of 64
data points.
The output gap is characterized by cyclical ups and downs. Hence the model generates an
endogenous business cycle. Closely connected to the up and down phases of output is the fraction of
optimists (ωopt). This result obviously follows from the speciﬁcation of our learning mechanism. In
times of high output, the forecasting rule of optimists (14) performs much better than the pessimists
rule (15). This results in a larger fraction of optimists and thus in a market expectation above
the steady state of zero
 
˜ Eq [xq+1] > 0
 
. Since the resulting high output, again, favors optimist
forecasting, the situation has a tendency to reproduce itself. Vice versa for phases dominated by
pessimists. Hence, expectations about the output gap have a self-fulﬁlling nature and generate
business cycles.
A similar pattern can be observed for expectation formation of the inﬂation rate. However, the
self-fulﬁlling tendency is not as strong as for the output gap. If inﬂation largely deviates from the
target (e.g. around q = 35), the targeter’s expectation rule performs poorly relative to that of the
extrapolators. As a result, the fraction of targeters (ωtar) decreases and inﬂation can become very
low. In contrast to the expectations of the output gap, the mechanism is not strong enough to
generate a self-fulﬁlling, cyclical regime switching.
The stock market is also characterized by the emergence of diﬀerent regimes. Most of the time,






























































































































































Figure 4: Model Output for a Time Period of Q = 40
18when a certain amount of fundamentalists is present in the market, the stock price follows its
perceived fundamental value (which is given by the dashed line) closely. Deviations from sf during
such phases are transitory and small in size. The course of the stock price is thus largely inﬂuenced
by the underlying real economy: st is high during the booms (q = 30,...,40 and q = 80,...,95) and
low during recessions (q = 10,...,20 and q = 59,...,70). If the market sentiments change in favor of
the chartists, stock prices become disconnected from the underlying fundamentals. Around q = 60,
for example, chartists form the dominating majority and the stock price moves away from sf. It
continues to follow a slight upward trend, although the underlying value falls, i.e. a bubble builds up.
In q = 62 market sentiments turn around, fundamentalists, who judge st as extremely over-valued,
become dominating and drive the price down again, i.e. the bubble bursts. The opposite case of
chartists driving st down below the fundamental value can be found for example around q = 45.
The model generates endogenous waves of optimism and pessimism, inﬂation-targeting and
inﬂation-extrapolation as well as chartism and fundamentalism. Each forecasting strategy is able to
dominate the market from time to time, but the evolutionary learning assures that none dominates
forever. The result is an endogenously occurring business cycle and endogenous stock price bubbles.
3.2 Impulse Response Analysis
In this subsection we analyze the eﬀects of an exogenous shock to the real sector. In DSGE models,
such questions are typically analyzed via impulse response functions that try to isolate the eﬀects
of an exogenous realization of the stochastic terms ǫi
q, ǫx
q and ǫπ
q. We focus on the impact of an
unanticipated, transitory cost shock without persistence of size ǫ
π,+
5 = 1. In order to allow for
impulse response analysis in a way similar to that typically used in DSGE models, we perform the
following experiment:
1. Generate the model dynamics for one particular random seed.
2. Generate the same dynamics with the same random seed (i.e. identical realizations of the
pseudo random numbers), but with ǫπ
5 increased by ǫ
π,+
5 = 1.
3. Calculate the diﬀerences between the trajectories of step 1 and 2 which gives the isolated
impact of the cost shock. Note that the noise terms are identical in both runs. Diﬀerences are
thus not a result of diﬀerent random numbers, but solely due to the imposed shock.
4. Repeat steps 1-3 10,000 times.
































































Figure 5: Mean response to a exogenous cost shock of size one. Dashed lines are 95 % quantiles.
Figure 5 shows the resulting responses to an exogenous shock of ǫ
π,+
5 = 1 for our baseline cali-
bration. The solid lines illustrate mean responses, while the dashed lines represent 95% quantiles.
On average, the economy shows the typical stagﬂationary response to the cost shock. Inﬂation and
the real interest rate rise, while output and the stock price fall. All impulse responses show high
volatility. The quantiles for the output gap, for example, illustrate that the reaction of xq can be
located anywhere between (a) a strong negative reaction on impact that is accelerated during the
subsequent two periods and followed by a hump-shaped path back towards trend and (b) no reaction
on impact followed by a slightly positive path in the medium and long run. The other time series
exhibit similarly volatile impulse responses. The only exception is (by construction of the shock)
the reaction of inﬂation on impact.
To analyze the source of this high volatility, we generate the impulse response functions of π and
s that result if either optimists or pessimists are dominating the market during the shock period. We
deﬁne a situation in which ω
opt
q ≥ 0.75 as dominated by optimists and a situation in which ω
pes
q ≥ 0.75
as dominated by pessimists. The top row in ﬁgure 6 shows the eﬀect on inﬂation and stock prices.
The reaction of stock prices is stronger when optimists dominate. If pessimists form the majority,
the amplitude is smaller for both time series. The economic logic underlying this phenomenon is
the following. If the number of optimists is high, the economy is caught in a self-reproducing circle
of high output and optimistic expectations. A huge contractionary shock can break this circle and
thus turn the boom into a recession. If pessimists dominate, such an ampliﬁcation mechanism can
































































































































Figure 6: Mean response of output and stock price with initial conditions dominated by diﬀerent
groups of agents
not emerge and the fall in GDP is much smaller. The same contractionary shock therefore has a
higher mean impact during a boom than during a recession.
Comparing impulse responses for those cases when targeters dominate with those dominated by
extrapolators,29 yields a similar picture (second row in ﬁgure 6). If the latter are dominating, the
impact of the shock is stronger on impact and more persistent for both time series. The economic
rationale is that extrapolators do not generate a mean-reversion. Since they expect the current
state of inﬂation to persist, they create persistence in the system. Persistence, in turn, makes their
own forecasting strategy more attractive and the number of extrapolators might increase further.
Therefore, the higher persistence in this case is also a result of self-fulﬁlling expectations. If targeters
dominate (i.e. the inﬂation target of the central bank is credible), the persistence of the shock is
much lower. Strong believes in a stable system obviously lead to a dampening of shocks. Whether
fundamentalists or chartists dominate the stock market does not play a major role in the transmission
of cost shocks.
29Dominance has been deﬁned analogously to the above case.
21The high volatility that has been found in the impulse responses of ﬁgure 5 is therefore partly a
result of the history dependence. Since the shock can have a diﬀerent impact on average depending
on the initial beliefs of agents, the uncertainty about the impact of the shock increases. De Grauwe
(2010a) has also analyzed the origin of persistence in his behavioral NKM and ﬁnds that responses
maintain persistent even if the hybrid character is turned oﬀ. This point is of interest, because
persistence has been a matter of concern in NKM modeling. In its baseline notation (for χ = 1
and ψ = 1 in (10)-(11)) those models do not produce persistent responses to non-persistent shocks.
De Grauwe argues that the evolutionary learning algorithm produces endogenous persistence, while
in standard NKM models persistence is introduced exogenously by assuming a hybrid form. Now
that we have gained some understanding of the dynamics of the model, we can use it to analyze a
prevailing question currently debated among policy makers.
4 Taxing Financial Transactions
The recent ﬁnancial crisis has created enormous costs in all industrialized economies. First, it
produced a huge decline in GDP and rise in unemployment. Second, the ﬁnancial positions of
states have been very negatively aﬀected because of several necessary stabilization policies like
capital injections, purchase of assets, ﬁscal stimuli, direct support and many more. On average, the
advanced G20 countries suﬀered a rise in government debt by 40%.30 Because of such rising debt,
several countries directly stumbled from the ﬁnancial- into the ﬁscal crisis. As a response to those
devastating externalities of the ﬁnancial sector, it should be asked, ﬁrst, whether new regulatory
policies are needed to stabilize this sector for the future and, second, whether it should provide a
ﬁnancial contribution to the recently generated costs. The traditional way of achieving both would
be to levy a ﬁnancial transaction tax (FTT) in the spirit of Tobin (1978). Such a tax would make
short term trading less attractive, while having no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on long term trading. Since
high frequency, speculative trading is a socially wasteful business, it would be beneﬁcial to curtail it
by introducing a FTT. Long run oriented trading that is based on underlying fundamental values,
is not aﬀected.31
In approaching this question, the G20 leaders have recently asked the IMF to prepare a report
30Consult IMF (2010).
31A nice executive summary of arguments in favor and against a FTT can be found in Schulmeister et al. (2008).
22on how the ”ﬁnancial sector could make a fair and substantial contribution” in bearing parts of
the induced burden.32 Summarizing the results of this report, the IMF argues that taxing ﬁnancial
transaction is generally a feasible policy instrument for achieving this goal and that ”the FTT should
not be dismissed on grounds of administrative practicality” (p. 19). However it also argues that the
traditional FTT might not be the best instrument to ”ﬁnance a resolution mechanism” and ”focus
on core sources of ﬁnancial instability”. Another slightly diﬀerent type of tax – called ﬁnancial
activities tax (FAT) – might be better suited than the FTT.
While policy makers are currently intensively debating the introduction of such taxes,33 one
striking aspect of the debate is ”that it is almost entirely unguided by the public ﬁnance literature
on the topic – because there is hardly any”34. In this section, we use our model to analyze the
advantages and disadvantages of both kinds of taxes with regard to their ability to stabilize markets
and to raise ﬁscal income. To evaluate their eﬀect on the variables of interest, we report the average








t resulting from a certain tax. We














Where TaxF is the tax payed by fundamentalists and TaxC the tax payed by chartists. Additionally























|zq| z = {x,π} (29)
The measure vol(·) denotes the volatility (i.e. rate of change) of a time series. Accordingly, dis(·)
measures its distortion (i.e. diﬀerence to fundamental steady state). We do not use the variance
32The mentioned report is IMF (2010).
33Besides the IMF and the G20, the European Commission and the European Parliament are currently examining
weather a ﬁnancial tax should be introduced. See for example EU (2010), EU (2011a) or EU (2011b).
34Quote taken from Keen (2011).
35Both measures closely follow Westerhoﬀ (2008).
23measure because it interprets volatility via the average squared distance from the mean. Our time
series show long-lasting deviations from the mean (which we interpret as bubbles or distortion).
When calculating the variance, one would not measure the volatility but rather the mean squared
distortion. To avoid confusion we do not use the variance measure.
The introduction of a FTT has already often been analyzed in the ABC ﬁnance literature. Ex-
amples are Westerhoﬀ (2003), Westerhoﬀ (2008) or Demary (2008). These studies, however, limit
their attention to the reduction of volatility and distortion of stock prices. Our study adds several
aspects to this literature: (1) We do not restrict our analysis to the stabilization of ﬁnancial mar-
kets but include real markets as well. (2) We contrast the classical FTT with the innovative, very
recently proposed FAT. (3) We also answer a question that has become very prevailing during the
recent ﬁscal crisis: how should a tax be designed in order to yield maximal tax revenues? There
has also been a number of empirical studies that investigate the impact of FTTs.36 These studies,
however, focus on short-term volatility and neglect long-term mispricing. We take the latter into
account, since it can lead to the built up and bursting of bubbles and therefore might have the most
important impact on the real economy.
4.1 Financial Transaction Tax
The basic characteristics of the FTT is that it is small in size but levied on a brought basis: the total
value of transaction. To introduce it into our model, we assume that the tax has to be paid relative
to the nominal value traded. Since complete investment consists of two transactions, the tax also has
to be paid twice. Orders generated in Dt−2 imply nominal transactions of Dt−2 · exp{st−1} in t − 1
and Dt−2 ·exp{st} in t. The tax rate τ is applied to the absolute nominal value of both transactions
(i.e. buys and sells are equally taxed). Since tax payments directly reduce the proﬁtability of an
investment, eq. (7) changes to:37
Ai
t = (exp{st} − exp{st−1})Di





  + dAi
t−1 (30)





  is the absolute value of Di
t−2. We run the model
for 500 quarters (32,000 days) with diﬀerent values for τ as well as 1000 diﬀerent realizations of the
36See IMF (2010) p. 20 for a summary of those studies.










































































































































































































Figure 7: Impact of Financial Transaction Tax (FTT)
pseudo random number generator for each τ. Figure 7 shows the average fraction of chartists and
fundamentalists, the gained tax revenue as well as volatility and distortion of s, x and π with respect
to the imposed FTT.
Increasing the tax rate (starting from zero), leads to a sharp decline in the fraction of chartist
traders which approximately equals zero for τ ≥ 0.6%. At the same time it slightly increases the
number of fundamentalist traders up to τ ≈ 0.1% and decreases it gradually for higher tax rates.
Tax revenue follows a typical Laﬀer curve: Increasing the tax rate up to τ ≈ 0.23% leads to rising
tax revenue. But increasing the tax rate further crowds too many agents out of the market and thus
leads to a falling tax income.
Concerning stability, we evaluate the FTT by how well it is capable of reducing volatility and
distortion of s, x and π. With respect to vol(s) and vol(π), the FTT has an exclusively positive
inﬂuence on stability. Increasing the FTT leads to monotonically decreasing volatility of stock prices
and inﬂation. The measures vol(x), dis(s), dis(x) and dis(π) recommend a diﬀerent conclusion. All
four follow a u-shaped pattern with minimum near τ = 0.3%. Therefore, with respect to these
variables, the FTT has an ambiguous impact. It stabilizes the market for small tax rates. If it
becomes too large (τ > 0.3%) the market is destabilized and the values of dis(s), dis(x) and dis(π)
become quickly very large.
254.2 Financial Activities Tax
A FAT, as proposed in the report of the IMF (2010) is ”levied on the sum of proﬁts and remuneration
of ﬁnancial institutions” (p. 21). Several detailed examples of how such a FAT could look like
can be found in the report (p. 66-70). In our model, we have to use a more stylized version of
course. Since, we do not consider labor costs in the ﬁnancial sector, all gains from stock trading
(exp{st} − exp{st−1})Di
t−2 are proﬁts. Thus we introduce a FAT into our model by taxing proﬁts
a constant rate of τ. If we assume further that the FAT only applies if proﬁts are positive, tax






· τ · (exp{st} − exp{st−1})Di
t−2
Where 1{R+} [y] is the indicator function that becomes 1 if y ∈ R+ and zero otherwise. Equation
(7) changes to:
Ai








· τ · (exp{st} − exp{st−1})Di
t−2 (32)
We perform the same experiment that we used to analyze the impact of the FTT. Results are
illustrated in ﬁgure 8. The rate of a FAT has to be much higher than that of a FTT because its
base is much smaller. In our analysis we account for tax rates between 0% and 50%. To allow for a
better comparability of the results, scaling of the ordinates is carried over from ﬁgure 7.
The tax slowly decreases the number of chartist while keeping the number of fundamentalists
almost constant. All other measures follow a monotonic path. Tax revenues rise while volatility
and distortion of s, x and π fall. The eﬀect of the FAT is thus clearly positive. Increasing it leads
to an improvement of all of our measures. An optimal value of τ can not be identiﬁed. Therefore
the question for the FAT’s size is not a question of economic optimality, but mainly one of political
feasibility.
For comparing both taxes with each other, we assume that the FTT is set in the range of optimal
values at τ = 0.28%. This rate leads to low market volatility and distortion at a high revenue
(section 4.1). For the FAT we assume diﬀerent values between 5% and 50%.38 The impact on all










































































































































































































Figure 8: Impact of Financial Activities Tax (FAT)
measures of interest are contrasted in table 2. For all values, the FAT leads to a higher fraction of
fundamentalists. All other measures are in favor of the FTT. The tax revenue is larger or at least
equally good for the FTT while all undesirable characteristics (WC, dis(·) and vol(·)) are smaller.
Note however, that a large fraction of fundamentalists is not an end in itself, it is only a useful
means to stabilize the market. Therefore, it is only a measure of second order compared to values
of distortion and volatility. Since the FTT leads to better (or at least equally good) results in all
other respect, we can conclude that the FTT strictly dominates the FAT.
A point in favor of the FAT is that there is no danger of setting the rate too high. If the optimal
rate for the FTT is missed and a larger rate is set (0.8% for example), huge distortions might occur
(ﬁgure 7). The FAT does not suﬀer from such a problem (ﬁgure 8) because of its monotonic impact.
The IMF also considers another variant of the FAT in its report and proposes: ”taxing high
returns more heavily than low” (p. 68). Adding such an element of progressivity, should discourage
risk-taking. To test the scope of such a progressive FAT (called FAT3 in the IMF report), we
perform the above experiment a third time. Instead of assuming a ﬂat tax as in equation (31) we
let the tax rate grow with proﬁts. The ﬁrst step in deﬁning such a tax, is to identify a threshold
value of proﬁts. Proﬁts above this threshold are deﬁned ’excess proﬁts’ and thus taxed higher. Let
27Table 2: Comparison of FTT with FAT
FTT FAT
0.28% 5% 10% 20% 35% 50%
WC 0.054 0.297 0.273 0.231 0.179 0.142
WF 0.367 0.400a 0.402 0.404 0.403 0.399
Revenue 3.2 ·10−5 0.9 ·10−5 1.6 ·10−5 2.5 ·10−5 2.9 ·10−5 3.0 ·10−5
dis(s) 0.228 0.256 0.251 0.243 0.234 0.229
dis(x) 0.249 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.249 0.249
dis(π) 0.171 0.174 0.173 0.173 0.172 0.171
vol(s) 0.009 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.011
vol(x) 0.211 0.212 0.212 0.212 0.212 0.211
vol(π) 0.139 0.140 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.139
a Bold numbers indicate that the FAT leads to better results than the FTT
Pt = (exp{st} − exp{st−1})Di
t−2 denote proﬁts. We deﬁne the benchmark P⋆ to be the standard
deviation of proﬁts:
P⋆ := std(Pt) (33)
A tax rate that is quadratically growing in P can be deﬁned as:






Such a tax deﬁnition has the following nice properties. If proﬁts equal P⋆ (the benchmark value),
they are taxed by a rate of τ (ﬁgure 9). If they are above P⋆ (excess proﬁts) they are taxed by
a higher rate that grows quadratically in P.39 For proﬁts below the threshold, the tax falls and
smoothly approaches zero at P = 0. The tax rate is thus progressive and not subject to any steps.
It also allows us to perform experiments similar to the ones above. By increasing (decreasing) τ, we
increase (decrease) the FAT for all (positive) values of P in the same direction while preserving the
general shape.
Figure 10 compares the results for the progressive FAT (bold line) with the ﬂat tax scenario of the
39For very high proﬁts eq. (34) might result in tax rates above 100%. Since such rates are unrealistic, we restrict the














Figure 9: Rate of the progressive FAT
previous experiment (thin line). Comparing both FAT’s leads to ambitious results. The progressive
FAT gives rise to a better stabilization for rates up to τ ≈ 30%: The number of fundamentalists
is higher while the number of chartists is lower compared to the ﬂat FAT. At the same time, all
volatility and distortion measures are lower. Only for high tax rates of 30% or more the results turn
around partly: vol(s), dis(s), vol(x), dis(x) and dis(π) are advantages under a ﬂat tax. The revenue
is larger under a progressive FAT between 0% and 11%. For tax rates above 11% the ﬂat FAT yields
more income. The nice property of monotonically decaying volatility and distortion that has already












































































































































































































Figure 10: Impact of progressive Financial Activities Tax (FAT)
The reason for this result can easily be explained by taking a look at the distribution of proﬁts.




































































Figure 11: Distribution of Proﬁts in a semi-log (left) and log-log scaled plot (right).
line), both, in a semi-log scaled plot and a log-log scaled plot. Both lines show the characteristic
fat tails.40 At the same time, the distribution of fundamentalist’s proﬁts has more density located
at low values while chartists have more density located at higher values. In the tail (i.e. for very
high proﬁts) both distributions are approximately equal. Fundamentalists (who earn lower proﬁts
on average) are thus favored by the progressive FAT, while chartists (who earn higher proﬁts on
average) are disadvantaged. As a result, the fraction of fundamentalists increases while that of
chartists decreases compared to a ﬂat FAT (ﬁgure 10, upper left panel). A more stable economy is
the result.
Finally, we compare the progressive FAT at diﬀerent rates with the FTT of 0.28%. Results are
given in table 3. For all values of the tax, the fraction of fundamentalists is higher than under the
FTT while the values of vol(π) are equal throughout all simulations. If we leave the fractions of
fundamentalists and chartists aside, the FTT again strictly dominates the FAT. We can therefore
conclude that the classical FTT is better suited than the new FAT in order to achive stabilization
of markets and raise funds from the ﬁnancial sector.
40Consult Lux (2009) on the empirical properties of ﬁnancial data.
30Table 3: Comparison of FTT with progressive FAT
FTT FAT (progressive)
0.28% 5% 10% 20% 35% 50%
WC 0.054 0.258 0.233 0.203 0.178 0.162
WF 0.367 0.424a 0.436 0.449 0.460 0.466
Revenue 3.2 ·10−5 1.8 ·10−5 1.7 ·10−5 1.7 ·10−5 1.6 ·10−5 1.6 ·10−5
dis(s) 0.228 0.243 0.239 0.235 0.234 0.233
dis(x) 0.249 0.250 0.249 0.249 0.249 0.249
dis(π) 0.171 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.171
vol(s) 0.009 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.012
vol(x) 0.211 0.212 0.212 0.212 0.212 0.212
vol(π) 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.139
a Bold numbers indicate that the FAT leads to better results than the FTT
5 Robustnes Checks
In this section, we check the robustness of our result with respect to some assumptions that we had
to make throughout our analysis. Since our simulations suggests that the FTT is the best way of
taxing the ﬁnancial sector, we focus on the robustness of our derived optimal FTT.
5.1 Parameterization
As mentioned in section 3, calibration of the intensity of choice parameters φ and e is probably the
most problematic one. Our ﬁrst robustness checks are therefore concerned with these parameters.
Table 4 and 5 show how some important results change with the variation of φ and e.
Table 4: Robustness check of intensity of choice parameter φ
φ = 5 φ = 8 φ = 10 φ = 12 φ = 15
minτ vol(x) 0.205 0.209 0.211 0.212 0.214
argminτ vol(x) 0.30% 0.28% 0.28% 0.28% 0.25%
minτ dis(x) 0.226 0.241 0.249 0.255 0.262
argminτ dis(x) 0.30% 0.29% 0.28% 0.28% 0.27%
minτ Revenue 3.2 ·10−5 3.2 ·10−5 3.2 ·10−5 3.2 ·10−5 3.2 ·10−5
argminτ Revenue 0.26% 0.26% 0.26% 0.26% 0.26%
31Our results are fairly robust against diﬀerent values of the parameter φ (table 4). The optimal
tax rate as well as the induced optimal values of vol(x), dis(x) and Revenue change only slightly.
The opposite holds for the parameter e. The optimal tax rate diverges strongly between 0.18%
and 0.54% for diﬀerent values of e (table 5). The induced Tax revenues are also subject to high
uncertainty.
This robustness test suggests, that reliable estimations of the intensity of choice parameter for the
ﬁnancial sector are of major importance for reliable policy suggestions. We have shown in section 4.1
that a too high FTT can result in huge distortion of the real economy. The negative eﬀects of a too
low FTT will instead be much smaller. A good strategy might thus be to set the FTT signiﬁcantly
below the value that is optimal with respect to a given parameterization in order to deal with the
uncertainty in an appropriately careful way.
Table 5: Robustness check of intensity of choice parameter e
e = 100 e = 200 e = 300 e = 400 e = 500
minτ vol(x) 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.211
argminτ vol(x) 0.54% 0.36% 0.28% 0.25% 0.18%
minτ dis(x) 0.248 0.248 0.249 0.250 0.251
argminτ dis(x) 0.80% 0.41% 0.28% 0.10% 0.12%
minτ Revenue 8.4 ·10−5 4.4 ·10−5 3.2 ·10−5 2.7 ·10−5 2.3 ·10−5
argminτ Revenue 0.81% 0.41% 0.26% 0.18% 0.16%
5.2 Taylor Rule
In this section we test the robustness against diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the Taylor rule. We begin
by introducing an interest smoothing parameter into (9). The current interest rate is thus not only
concerned with reducing inﬂation and the output gap but also with producing a smooth path of iq
over time. Variation A of the policy rule is thus given by:
iq = λ
 
δπ˜ Eq [πq+1] + δx˜ Eq [xq+1]
 
+ (1 − λ)iq−1 + ǫi
q (35)
As a second variation, we assume that the board of the central bank is composed of a set of
heterogeneous agents who form expectations diﬀerently. Some are optimistic about future output
and some are pessimistic. The expectations and fractions of optimistic and pessimistic central
32bankers are the same as for the other agents. Thus, they are given by ˜ E
opt







q as deﬁned in section 2.2. Assume that the majority of central bankers can fully introduce
their expectations into the policy rule. The expectation that enters the Taylor rule is then given by:















In other words, the central bank’s decision structure is such that it become fully optimistic if optimists
dominate and fully pessimistic if pessimists dominate. Variation B of the Taylor rule is given by:
iq = δπˆ Eq [πq+1] + δxˆ Eq [xq+1] + ǫi
q (37)
Where ˆ Eq [πq+1] is formed analogous to ˆ Eq [xq+1].






minτ vol(x) 0.211 0.203 0.228
argminτ vol(x) 0.28% 0.24% 0.20%
minτ dis(x) 0.249 0.278 0.272
argminτ dis(x) 0.28% 0.24% 0.29%
minτ Revenue 3.2 ·10−5 3.2 ·10−5 3.3 ·10−5
argminτ Revenue 0.26% 0.26% 0.27%
Table 6 compares our result for the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the Taylor rule. The parameter λ
in Variation A is set to λ = 0.75.41 The results show that the measures of stability and tax revenue
are only subject to minor change. The optimal tax rate that minimizes vol(x) undergoes the largest
change. It falls by 0.04% in case of variation A and 0.08% for variation B. This uncertainty again
suggests that the rate of the FTT should be set to lower rates compared to those that are optimal
given our baseline speciﬁcation.
41The same analysis for a wider λ-range as well as the impulse response functions resulting from the variation of the
Taylor Rules can be found in the online appendix.
336 Conclusion
We have developed a model that combines agent-based ﬁnancial market theory with New Keynesian
macroeconomics. The two employed submodels are simple representatives of their respective disci-
pline. They are both subject to an evolutionary process of expectation formation that sorts out the
poorly performing strategies in favor of the good ones. Interaction between the two models is brought
about by two straightforward channels. Our comprehensive model is very stylized and not yet ready
for econometric analysis. But even with this simplistic methodology, we are able to show that the
behavioral structure of our model has a strong impact on the transmission of shocks. The market
sentiments in the shock period, for example, can lead to a very diﬀerent average transmissions.
We also used the model to analyze a question that is currently debated among policy makers.
Namely, if the introduction of a tax on ﬁnancial transactions can bring about positive developments
for the overall economy. We ﬁnd that such a tax could generally reduce volatility and distortion of
the real and ﬁnancial market variables, but that its size and type plays an important role. If the tax
is of the FTT type, it is very eﬃcient in bringing down volatility and raising tax revenue, but if set
too high, the macroeconomy might also be subject to very strong distortion. The FAT is less able to
stabilize the market and also generates less revenue for the state. But in contrast to the FTT, it does
not create large distortions when set too high. We have shown that the optimal decision of making
the FAT ﬂat or progressive is depending on the tax rate. For values below 11% the progressive
version is the best choice, while for rates above 40% the ﬂat tax version is preferable. In between,
the progressive tax leads to better stabilization while the ﬂat tax generates more revenue.
Our model is stylized and simple to implement. Of course, it can also be used for numerous
augmentations: (1) The eﬀects of diﬀerent cross-sectoral channels (e.g. Tobin’s q or stock wealth
eﬀect) can be analyzed. (2) The rules that deﬁne the behavior of the ﬁnancial market agents
(like the time horizon of investors’ strategies) can be changed. (3) Since the occurrence of bubbles
implies large deviations from the fundamental steady state, one might also use a version of the NKM
submodel that is not log-linearized. (4) Moreover, we do not take ﬁnancial streams between the real
and the ﬁnancial sector explicitly into account. A simpliﬁcation that might be relaxed in future
research.
We see this paper as an early stage in a broader research agenda. The agent-based method
oﬀers enormous new possibilities for macroeconomics. Our research agenda is targeted at further
34exploration of these possibilities. The paper at hand tries to bridge the gap between this newly
emerging ﬁeld42 and mainstream macro. It uses new methods (like interaction and evolutionary
learning), but also builds on traditional methods and assumption (like market equilibrium or utility
maximization in the NKM part). Future research will focus on working out the agent-based part
further.
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∗∗E-mail: wohltmann@economics.uni-kiel.de1 Robustness to Diﬀerent Deﬁnitions of Weights
For integrating the real- and ﬁnancial sector, we have assumed that all daily realizations of st enter
the quarterly value sq with equal weights. An alternative would be to assume geometrically decaying





with: weightt = (1 − ρ) · ρ64q−t 0 < ρ < 1 (2)
High values for ρ lead to slowly decaying weights, low values result in quickly decaying weights.
Geometric weights of this form add up to one for very long time periods. For a smaller period of
64 days they do not. We thus rescale our weights by multiplying with a constant that keeps the
relative weight between diﬀerent st constant but yields
64q X
t=64(q−1)+1
weightt = 1 (3)
Table 1: Robustness check of weighting assumption in equation (24)
Weights equal geometrically decaying
ρ = 0.99 ρ = 0.9 ρ = 0.75 ρ = 0.5
minτ vol(x) 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.211
argminτ vol(x) 0.28% 0.28% 0.28% 0.28% 0.28%
minτ dis(x) 0.249 0.249 0.250 0.251 0.251
argminτ dis(x) 0.28% 0.28% 0.28% 0.28% 0.28%
minτ Revenue 3.2 ·10−5 3.2 ·10−5 3.2 ·10−5 3.2 ·10−5 3.2 ·10−5
argminτ Revenue 0.26% 0.26% 0.26% 0.26% 0.26%
Table 1 shows that our results are very robust against the assumption of diﬀerent weights in (24).
The minimal distortion of the output gap changes marginally. All other results stay constant.
11.1 Taylor Rule
Variation A of the Taylor rule has been deﬁned as:
iq = λ
￿
δπˆ Eq [πq+1] + δxˆ Eq [xq+1]
￿
+ (1 − λ)iq−1 + ǫi
q (4)
Table 2 shows the results of a robustness check for diﬀerent values of λ. Moving away from our
baseline calibration (λ = 1.0) monotonically increases distortion of x in the optimum. This result
obviously follows from the fact that the central bank is less concerned with stabilizing output and
more with smoothing the interest rate. The volatility of x, instead, falls until λ = 0.75 and rises
afterwards. A moderate weight on interest smoothing therefore reduces volatility of output while a
high weight leads to an increase. The reason for this result is the following. The Taylor rule depends
on expectations about the future values of x and π. Since these are formed in a non-rational way,
they are a potential source of volatility. Reducing the weight of these expectations therefore leads
to a decline of vol(x). If λ becomes too small, the inﬂuence of the stabilizing role of monetary policy
declines by so much that vol(x) rises again.
Table 2: Robustness check of the interest smoothing parameter λ
λ = 1.0 λ = 0.9 λ = 0.75 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.3
minτ vol(x) 0.211 0.206 0.203 0.212 0.235
argminτ vol(x) 0.28% 0.27% 0.24% 0.22% 0.14%
minτ dis(x) 0.249 0.257 0.278 0.355 0.543
argminτ dis(x) 0.28% 0.27% 0.24% 0.11% 0.08%
minτ Revenue 3.2 ·10−5 3.2 ·10−5 3.2 ·10−5 3.3 ·10−5 3.5 ·10−5
argminτ Revenue 0.26% 0.26% 0.26% 0.25% 0.18%
Concerning the tax rates, we ﬁnd again that an optimal value might lie signiﬁcantly below the
values that have been found to be optimal in our baseline calibration. Figures 1 and 2 show the
impulse responses under our alternative Taylor rules.





































































Figure 1: Cost shock for iq = δπˆ Eq [πq+1] + δxˆ Eq [xq+1] + ǫi
q








































































Figure 2: Cost shock for iq = λ
￿
δπˆ Eq [πq+1] + δxˆ Eq [xq+1]
￿
+ (1 − λ)iq−1 + ǫi
q with λ = 0.3
3